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Enduring lending relationships and european firms default

Author

Listed:
  • Agostino, Mariarosaria
  • Errico, Lucia
  • Rondinella, Sandro
  • Trivieri, Francesco

Abstract

This paper investigates the link between close banking relationships and European manufacturing firms’ defaults. Based on binary outcomes (i.e., Logit, Probit, Complementary log-log) and discrete-time models, the empirical analysis reveals that enduring lending relationships present benefits in reducing firms’ temporary and permanent defaults. This evidence suggests that, in a framework of limited credit access that may compromise firms’ survival, relationship lending might represent an effective tool for overcoming asymmetric information problems, helping firms relax credit constraints, encouraging greater discipline in their managers, and preventing failure.

Suggested Citation

  • Agostino, Mariarosaria & Errico, Lucia & Rondinella, Sandro & Trivieri, Francesco, 2023. "Enduring lending relationships and european firms default," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(4), pages 459-477.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:77:y:2023:i:4:p:459-477
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2023.07.001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lending relationships; Firms default; Survival analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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