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Lending relationships and credit rationing: the impact of securitization

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  • Carbó Valverde, Santiago
  • Degryse, Hans
  • Rodriguez-Fernandez, Francisco

Abstract

Banks have been heavily involved in securitization. We study whether the involvedness of a firm’s main bank into different types of securitization activity -- asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds -- influences credit supply before and during the 2007-8 financial crisis. Both types of securitization allow the bank to generate liquidity. To the extent that ABS activity lowers lending standards in normal times, banks with more ABS activity may reduce their lending more in crisis times as an ex-post effect of a previously higher risk adoption. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that a longer relationship with a firm’s main bank considerable improve credit supply. In general, we find that a relationship with a bank that is more involved in securitization activities relaxes credit constraints in normal periods. In contrast, while a relationship with a firm’s main bank that issues covered bonds reduces credit rationing during crisis periods, the issuance of asset backed securities by a firm’s main bank aggravates these firm’s credit rationing in crisis periods.

Suggested Citation

  • Carbó Valverde, Santiago & Degryse, Hans & Rodriguez-Fernandez, Francisco, 2012. "Lending relationships and credit rationing: the impact of securitization," CEPR Discussion Papers 9138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9138
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bedendo, Mascia & Bruno, Brunella, 2012. "Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3260-3273.
    2. Tobias Berg & Daniel Streitz & Michael Wedow, 2015. "Real Effects of Securitization," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1514, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Emanuele Brancati, 2013. "The Real Side of the Financial Crisis: Banks' Exposure, Flight to Quality and Firms' Investment Rate," CEIS Research Paper 302, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 20 Mar 2014.
    4. Andrea F. Presbitero & Gregory F. Udell & Alberto Zazzaro, 2014. "The Home Bias and the Credit Crunch: A Regional Perspective," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(s1), pages 53-85, February.
    5. Brancati, Emanuele, 2013. "Innovation activity and nancing constraints: evidence from Italy during the crises," MPRA Paper 47750, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial crisis; lending relationships; securitization;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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