What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Mariassunta Giannetti & Mike Burkart & Tore Ellingsen, 2011. "What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(4), pages 1261-1298.
- Giannetti, Mariassunta & Burkart, Mike & Ellingsen, Tore, 2011. "What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69543, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
More about this item
Keywordscollateral; contract theory; moral hazard; trade credits;
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CFN-2005-06-14 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2005-06-14 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-INT-2005-06-14 (International Trade)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4823. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .