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Similar bidders in takeover contests

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  • Dai, Yun
  • Gryglewicz, Sebastian
  • Smit, Han T.J.
  • De Maeseneire, Wouter

Abstract

When bidders in a corporate takeover have related resources and post-acquisition strategies, their valuations of a target are likely to be interdependent. This paper analyzes sequential-entry takeover contests in which similar bidders have correlated private valuations. The level of similarity affects information content of bids and bidding competition. Our model predicts that expected acquisition prices and the probability of multiple-bidder contests are the highest for intermediately similar bidders. We test these predictions in laboratory experiments in which we control the similarity between bidders. The experimental data confirm the non-monotonic effects of similarity on prices and on the frequency of multiple-bidder contents.

Suggested Citation

  • Dai, Yun & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Smit, Han T.J. & De Maeseneire, Wouter, 2013. "Similar bidders in takeover contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 544-561.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:544-561
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.010
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Takeover contests; Interdependent valuations; Information externality; Competition intensity; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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