Pre-Tender Offer Share Acquisition Strategy in Takeovers
This paper models the strategic pre-tender offer share acquisition problem faced by potential bidders in takeovers. The model provides a rational explanation for the seemingly anomalous empirical evidence that the information about the impending tender offers is not fully conveyed through the potential bidders' pre-tender offer trades and for the evidence that a large fraction of bidders do not hold any target shares prior to launching the tender offers. Additional testable implications are also provided.
Volume (Year): 29 (1994)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
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