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Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions

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  • Aktas, Nihat
  • de Bodt, Eric
  • Roll, Richard

Abstract

Recent empirical research has shown that, from deal to deal, serial acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are declining. This has been most often attributed to CEOs hubris. We question this interpretation. Our theoretical analysis shows that (i) a declining CAR from deal to deal is not sufficient to reveal the presence of hubris, (ii) if CEOs are learning, economically motivated and rational, a declining CAR from deal to deal should be observed, (iii) predictions can be derived about the impact of learning and hubris on the time between successive deals and, finally, (iv) predictions about the CAR and about the time between successive deal trends lead to testable empirical hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

  • Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2009. "Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 543-561, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:15:y:2009:i:5:p:543-561
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhu, PengCheng, 2011. "Persistent performance and interaction effects in sequential cross-border mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 18-39, February.
    2. Jaffe, Jeffrey & Pedersen, David & Voetmann, Torben, 2013. "Skill differences in corporate acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 166-181.
    3. Al Rahahleh, Naseem & Wei, Peihwang Philip, 2012. "The performance of frequent acquirers: Evidence from emerging markets," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 16-33.
    4. Bargeron, Leonce L. & Lehn, Kenneth & Moeller, Sara B. & Schlingemann, Frederik P., 2014. "Disagreement and the informativeness of stock returns: The case of acquisition announcements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 155-172.
    5. Cornett, Marcia Millon & Tanyeri, Basak & Tehranian, Hassan, 2011. "The effect of merger anticipation on bidder and target firm announcement period returns," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 595-611, June.
    6. Dutta, Dev K. & Malhotra, Shavin & Zhu, PengCheng, 2016. "Internationalization process, impact of slack resources, and role of the CEO: The duality of structure and agency in evolution of cross-border acquisition decisions," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 212-225.
    7. Panayiotis C. Andreou & Christodoulos Louca & Christos S. Savva, 2016. "Short-horizon event study estimation with a STAR model and real contaminated events," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 673-697, October.
    8. Ivo Jansen & Lee Sanning & Nathan Stuart, 2015. "Do hubris and the information environment explain the effect of acquirers’ size on their gains from acquisitions?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(2), pages 211-234, April.
    9. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2013. "Learning from repetitive acquisitions: Evidence from the time between deals," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 99-117.
    10. Frijns, Bart & Gilbert, Aaron & Lehnert, Thorsten & Tourani-Rad, Alireza, 2013. "Uncertainty avoidance, risk tolerance and corporate takeover decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2457-2471.
    11. John S. Marsh & William J. Wales & Fariss-Terry Mousa & Rachel Graefe-Anderson, 2016. "Countermove: how CEOs respond to post-acquisition compensation adjustments," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 711-755, October.
    12. Liu, Jia & Lister, Roger & Pang, Dong, 2013. "Corporate evolution following initial public offerings in China: A life-course approach," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 1-20.
    13. Bessler, Wolfgang & Schneck, Colin & Zimmermann, Jan, 2015. "Bidder contests in international mergers and acquisitions: The impact of toeholds, preemptive bidding, and termination fees," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 4-23.
    14. Golubov, Andrey & Yawson, Alfred & Zhang, Huizhong, 2015. "Extraordinary acquirers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 314-330.
    15. Anja Trichterborn & Dodo Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß & Lars Schweizer, 2016. "How to improve acquisition performance: The role of a dedicated M&A function, M&A learning process, and M&A capability," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(4), pages 763-773, April.
    16. Bradrania, Reza & Westerholm, P. Joakim & Yeoh, James, 2016. "Do CEOs who trade shares adopt more aggressive corporate investment strategies?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 349-366.
    17. Benjamin Dietz & Dodo zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2017. "Beyond a One-Size-Fits-All Explanation for Reacquisitions – A Cluster-based Analysis of Reacquisition Motives and Their Influence on the Involved Firms," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 18(1), pages 1-28, February.
    18. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2011. "Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, February.

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