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Which acquirers gain more, single or multiple? Recent evidence from the USA market

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  • Ismail, Ahmad

Abstract

This study considers shareholder returns using 16,221 US takeovers between 1985 and 2004. It finds that single acquirers out-perform multiple acquirers by 1.66%, and that the gap widens to 5% in equity exchange offers. In contrast to multiple acquirers, single acquirers generate higher returns in equity deals than in cash and mixed offers, due to the high returns earned through the acquisition of non-public targets. Unsuccessful first time acquirers learn but successful first time bidders suffer from hubris behavior in subsequent acquisitions. The study finds that size, relative size, and valuation differences could explain the higher returns for single acquirers, and that the toehold presence leads to paying lower premiums.

Suggested Citation

  • Ismail, Ahmad, 2008. "Which acquirers gain more, single or multiple? Recent evidence from the USA market," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 72-84.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:19:y:2008:i:1:p:72-84
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    Cited by:

    1. Al Rahahleh, Naseem & Wei, Peihwang Philip, 2012. "The performance of frequent acquirers: Evidence from emerging markets," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 16-33.
    2. Mateev, Miroslav, 2017. "Is the M&A announcement effect different across Europe? More evidences from continental Europe and the UK," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 190-216.
    3. Manapol Ekkayokkaya & Phil Holmes & Krishna Paudyal, 2009. "Limited Information and the Sustainability of Unlisted-Target Acquirers' Returns," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(9-10), pages 1201-1227.
    4. Kerstin Fehre & Daniel Kronenwett & Hagen Lindstädt & Michael Wolff, 2016. "Lost in transaction? The transfer effect of strategic consistency," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 9(1), pages 101-131, April.
    5. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2009. "Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 543-561, December.
    6. George Giannopoulos & Ehsan Khansalar & Patel Neel, 2017. "The Impact of Single and Multiple Mergers and Acquisitions on Shareholders¡¯ Wealth of UK Bidder Firms," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(3), pages 141-167, March.
    7. Amor, Salma Ben & Kooli, Maher, 2016. "Do acquisitions affect IPO long-run performance? Evidence from single vs. multiple acquirers," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 63-79.
    8. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2011. "Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, February.

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