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Do managers listen to the market?

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  • Kau, James B.
  • Linck, James S.
  • Rubin, Paul H.

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  • Kau, James B. & Linck, James S. & Rubin, Paul H., 2008. "Do managers listen to the market?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 347-362, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:14:y:2008:i:4:p:347-362
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    3. Chikh, Sabrina & Filbien, Jean-Yves, 2011. "Acquisitions and CEO power: Evidence from French networks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 1221-1236.
    4. Ordu, Umut & Schweizer, Denis, 2015. "Executive compensation and informed trading in acquiring firms around merger announcements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 260-280.
    5. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2009. "Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 543-561, December.
    6. Bargeron, Leonce L. & Lehn, Kenneth & Moeller, Sara B. & Schlingemann, Frederik P., 2014. "Disagreement and the informativeness of stock returns: The case of acquisition announcements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 155-172.
    7. Dayanandan, Ajit & Donker, Han & Karahan, Gökhan, 2017. "Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 16-29.
    8. Liu, Baixiao & McConnell, John J., 2013. "The role of the media in corporate governance: Do the media influence managers' capital allocation decisions?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-17.
    9. repec:eee:corfin:v:46:y:2017:i:c:p:97-120 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Krainer, Robert, 2009. "Portfolio and financing adjustments for U.S. banks: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, pages 1-24.
    11. Jiang, Li & Kim, Jeong-Bon & Pang, Lei, 2011. "Control-ownership wedge and investment sensitivity to stock price," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 2856-2867, November.
    12. Jacobsen, Stacey, 2014. "The death of the deal: Are withdrawn acquisition deals informative of CEO quality?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 54-83.
    13. repec:eee:bushor:v:60:y:2017:i:3:p:415-425 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Aktas, Nihat & Cousin, Jean-Gabriel & Ozdakak, Ali & Zhang, Junyao, 2016. "Industry IPOs, growth opportunities, and private target acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 193-209.
    15. De Cesari, Amedeo & Huang-Meier, Winifred, 2015. "Dividend changes and stock price informativeness," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 1-17.
    16. repec:eee:quaeco:v:65:y:2017:i:c:p:240-248 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Chahine, Salim & Goergen, Marc, 2014. "Top management ties with board members: How they affect pay–performance sensitivity and IPO performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, pages 99-115.
    18. Mu-Shun Wang, 2016. "Idiosyncratic volatility, executive compensation and corporate governance: examination of the direct and moderate effects," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, pages 213-244.
    19. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Kelly, David L. & Taylor, Curtis R., 2017. "Selloffs, bailouts, and feedback: Can asset markets inform policy?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 294-343.
    20. Staudigl, Mathias & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Constrained interactions and social coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 41-63.
    21. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2011. "Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, February.
    22. repec:kap:rqfnac:v:49:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11156-016-0599-4 is not listed on IDEAS

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