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Citations for "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information"

by Canzoneri, Matthew B

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1. Christopher Sleet, 2004. "Optimal Taxation with Private Government Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 1217-1239, October.
2. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(04), pages 751-774, September.
   
   • Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2001. "Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2542, The World Bank.
3. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2005. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 52, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
   
   • Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2008. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 55-87, March.
   • Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2004. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," DNB Working Papers 017, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
   • Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2005. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," Working Papers 02, Economic Research Southern Africa.
4. Letterie, Wilko, 1997. " Better Monetary Control May Decrease the Distortion of Stabilisation Policy: A Comment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(3), pages 463-70, September.
   
   • Letterie, Wilko, 1997. "Better monetary control may decrease the distortion of stabilisation policy: a comment," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20500, Maastricht University.
5. Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   
   • Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
   • Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
6. Ammer, John & Freeman, Richard T., 1995. "Inflation targeting in the 1990s: The experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-192, May.
7. Schellekens Ph., 1999. "Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks," Working Papers 1999009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
8. Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1999. "The Effects of Transmission Uncertainty on the Flexibility-Credibility Tradeoff in Monetary Policy," Research Discussion Papers 14/1999, Bank of Finland.
   
   • Senegas, M.A. & Vilmunen, J., 1999. "The Effects of Transmission Uncertainty on the Flexibility-Cridibility Tradeoff in Monetary Policy," Bank of Finland - Studies in Economics and Finance 14/99, Bank of Finland. Research Department..
9. Ugo Panizza, 1997. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers: Inflation versus Money Supply and Exchange Rate Targets," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-29, January.
10. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1998. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Papers 1995-015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    
    • Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1996. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Paper 9601, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
11. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," Discussion Papers 1494, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    
    • George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 91-98, May.
    • Geore-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000289, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," NBER Working Papers 10391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
12. Adam Geršl, 2007. "Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 67-86, March.
    
    • Adam Geršl, 2005. "Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform," Working Papers IES 98, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
13. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Oh, Seonghwan, 1995. "When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 341-357, April.
    
    • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and how much to talk: credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Working Papers 1990-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 593, UCLA Department of Economics.
14. Tarkka, Juha & Mayes, David, 1999. "The Value of Publishing Official Central Bank Forecasts," Research Discussion Papers 22/1999, Bank of Finland.
15. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2001. "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England.
    
    • Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
16. Lavan Mahadeva, 2007. "A model of market surprises," Bank of England working papers 327, Bank of England.
17. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
18. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Fear Of Floating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 379-408, May.
    
    • Reinhart, Carmen & Calvo, Guillermo, 2002. "Fear of floating," MPRA Paper 14000, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2000. "Fear of Floating," NBER Working Papers 7993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
19. Ma, Jun, 1995. "Modelling central-local fiscal relations in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 105-136.
20. Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2006. "Monetary policies for developing countries: The role of institutional quality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 239-252, September.
    
    • Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2005. "Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Institutional Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 4911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
21. Elmar Mertens, 2008. "Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion?," Working Papers 08.02, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    
    • Elmar Mertens, 2010. "Managing beliefs about monetary policy under discretion," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2010-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
22. Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2012. "Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 009614, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
    
    • Julian A. Parra POlanía, 2012. "Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?," Borradores de Economia 711, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
23. John Ammer & Richard T. Freeman, 1994. "Inflation targeting in the 1990s: the experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom," International Finance Discussion Papers 473, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
24. Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument," NBER Working Papers 13398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument," Staff Report 394, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
25. Helge Berger & Marcel Thum, 2000. "News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(4), pages 465-493, November.
26. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2006. "Signaling And Commitment: Monetary Versus Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(05), pages 595-624, November.
    
    • Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2003. "Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
27. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence: Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Discussion Paper 1993-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
28. Vitale, Paolo, 2003. "Foreign exchange intervention: how to signal policy objectives and stabilise the economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 841-870, May.
29. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2001. "On the optimality of transparent monetary policy," Working Papers 613, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
30. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Working papers 2000-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002.
    
    • Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
31. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2005. "A model of monetary unification under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15.
32. Paul Masson & Jacques Melitz, 1991. "Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 113-136, June.
33. José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May.
34. Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moïse, 2009. "Public investment, distortionary taxes and monetary policy transparency," MPRA Paper 15858, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    
    • Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2009. "Public investment, distortionary taxes and monetary policy transparency," Working Papers of BETA 2009-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
35. Laubach, Thomas, 2003. "Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 985-1009, December.
36. Philip Arestis & Alexander Mihailov, 2008. "Classifying Monetary Economics: Fields and Methods from Past to Future," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2008-64, Henley Business School, Reading University.
    
    • Philip Arestis & Alexander Mihailov, 2011. "Classifying Monetary Economics: Fields And Methods From Past To Future," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 769-800, 09.
37. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
    
    • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," CEPR Discussion Papers 1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    • Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
38. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1996. "Federal Reserve Private Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates," NBER Working Papers 5692, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
39. Kiguel, Miguel A. & Liviatan, Nissan, 1988. "Inflationary rigidities and stabilization policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4, The World Bank.
40. Andrew G Haldane & Vicky Read, 2000. "Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve," Bank of England working papers 106, Bank of England.
41. Edward J. Green, 2001. "Central banking and the economics of information," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 28-37.
42. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2004. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," Working Paper Series 338, European Central Bank.
    
    • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2005. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1431-1475, 09.
    • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2004. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 801, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick Kehoe, 2003. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 10109, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2002. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," Working Papers 626, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2004. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy," Staff Report 326, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
43. Michael D. Bordo, 1996. "The Gold Standard as a `Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval'," NBER Working Papers 5340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • Bordo, Michael D. & Rockoff, Hugh, 1996. "The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 389-428, June.
    • Hugh Rockoff & Michael D. Bordo, 1996. "The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval"," Departmental Working Papers 199528, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
44. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-11, May.
45. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    
    • Bennett T. McCallum, 1996. "Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
46. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January.
    
    • Marvin Goodfriend, 1985. "Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking," Working Paper 85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
47. Meixing DAI & Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, 2009. "Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences," Working Papers of BETA 2009-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    
    • Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moise, 2008. "Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences," MPRA Paper 13907, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
48. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Central banks and information provided to the private sector," Macroeconomics 0504025, EconWPA, revised 27 Apr 2005.
    
    • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2002. "Central banks and information provided to the private sector," Working Papers 61, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
    • Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Central Banks and Information Provided to the Private Sector," Macroeconomics 0311009, EconWPA.
49. Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin, 2006. "Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 36-73, March.
50. Cone, Thomas E., 2008. "Optimal information acquisition and monetary policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1370-1389, December.
51. Hubert, Paul, 2010. "Monetary Policy, Imperfect Information and the Expectations Channel," Open Access publications from Sciences Po info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1u, Sciences Po.
52. Sleet, Christopher, 2001. "On Credible Monetary Policy and Private Government Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 338-376, July.
53. Jan Libich, 2006. "Inflexibility Of Inflation Targeting Revisited: Modeling The "Anchoring"Effect," CAMA Working Papers 2006-02, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
54. Paul Hubert, 2009. "An Empirical Review of Federal Reserve’s Informational Advantage," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2009-03, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
55. Aubert, Ludovic & Laskar, Daniel, 1999. "Private information : an argument for a fixed exchange rate system," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9903, CEPREMAP.
56. P Arestis & A Mihailov, 2009. "Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 14(2), pages 27-54, September.
    
    • Philip Arestis & Alexander Mihailov, 2007. "Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy," Economic Analysis Research Group Working Papers earg-wp2007-13, Henley Business School, Reading University.
    • Philip Arestis & Alexander Mihailov, 2007. "Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2007-53, Henley Business School, Reading University.
57. Marek Rozkrut, 2008. "It’s not only WHAT is said, it’s also WHO the speaker is. Evaluating the effectiveness of central bank communication," National Bank of Poland Working Papers 47, National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute.
58. Haizhou Huang & Shang-Jin Wei, 2003. "Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Corruption," IMF Working Papers 03/183, International Monetary Fund.
    
    • Haizhou Huang & Shang-Jin Wei, 2003. "Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Corruption," NBER Working Papers 10093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
59. André P. Calmon & Thomas Vallée & João B. R. Do Val, 2009. "Monetary policy as a source of uncertainty," Working Papers hal-00422454, HAL.
60. Bennett T. McCallum, 1985. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • Bennett T. McCallum, 1984. "Credibility and monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 105-135.
61. Kenneth S. Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1985. "Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles Anne Sibert," International Finance Discussion Papers 271, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
62. Waters, George A., 2007. "Regime changes, learning and monetary policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 255-282, June.
63. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hibbs Jr., Douglas A., 2004. "Labor market regimes and the effects of monetary policy," Working Papers in Economics 145, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised 22 Apr 2005.
    
    • Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hibbs Jr., Douglas A., 2008. "Labor market regimes and the effects of monetary policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 134-156, March.
64. Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2009. "How Flexible Can Inflation Targeting Be? Suggestions for the Future of Canada's Targeting Regime," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 293, August.
65. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 329-350, November.
    
    • Laurence M. Ball, 1990. "Time-Consistent Policy and Persistent Changes in Inflation," NBER Working Papers 3529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
66. T. Christopher Canavan, 1995. "Can Ignorance Make Central Banks Behave?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 291., Boston College Department of Economics.
67. Francesco Papadia & Gian Ruggiero, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-90, February.
68. Johannes Groeneveld & Kees Koedijk & Clemens Kool, 1998. "Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Strategies: Evidence from Six Industrialized Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 21-38, January.
69. Libich, Jan, 2008. "An explicit inflation target as a commitment device," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 43-68, March.
    
    • Jan Libich, 2006. "An Explicit Inflation Target As A Commitment Device," CAMA Working Papers 2006-22, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
70. Rozkrut, Marek & Rybinski, Krzysztof & Sztaba, Lucyna & Szwaja, Radoslaw, 2007. "Quest for central bank communication: Does it pay to be "talkative"?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 176-206, March.
71. Robert Rennhack, 1991. "La Conducción de la Política Monetaria," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 28(83), pages 11-20.
72. Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 1999. "Disegno delle istituzioni e stabilità finanziaria nell'Unione Monetaria Europea
    [Istitutional design and financial stability in EMU]," MPRA Paper 18692, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    
    • Lossani Marco & Natale Piergiovanna & Tirelli Patrizio, 1999. "Disegno delle istituzioni e stabilità finanziaria nell'Unione Monetaria Europea," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 243-270.
73. Ellis, C.J. & Holden, S., 1992. "Optimal Contract Length in a Reputational Model of Monetary Policy," Memorandum 11/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    
    • Ellis, Christopher J. & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Optimal contract length in a reputational model of monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-243, February.
74. Maria Demertzis, 2006. "The role of expectations in monetary policy," DNB Working Papers 118, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    
    • Maria Demertzis, 2006. "The Role of Expectations in Monetary Policy," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 393-412, December.
75. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "Strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information: optimal targeting periods," Working Papers 1990-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    
    • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy With Private Information: Optimal Targeting Periods," UCLA Economics Working Papers 584, UCLA Department of Economics.
76. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2003. "Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs and Contract Targets," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 101-112, January.
    
    • Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000. "Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets," Working papers 2000-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
77. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1998. "Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 225-241, May.
78. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 11826, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
79. Reinhart, Carmen, 2001. "Fear of Floating: Exchange Rate Flexibility Indices," MPRA Paper 13196, University Library of Munich, Germany.
80. Nathan Balke & Joseph H. Haslag, 1988. "Augmented information in a theory of ambiguity, credibility and inflation," Research Paper 8804, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
81. Thomas Jordan, 2001. "Monetary control uncertainty and inflation bias," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 125-147, June.
82. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1997. "Central bank independence and public debt policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(4-5), pages 873-894, May.
    
    • Bovenberg, A.L. & Beetsma, R.M.W.J., 1997. "Central Bank independence and public debt policy," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-74443, Tilburg University.
83. Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
84. Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2001. "The Advantage of Transparent Instruments of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8681, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2001. "The advantage of transparent instruments of monetary policy," Working Papers 614, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
85. Ronald A. Ratti, 1999. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers and Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Regimes," Macroeconomics 9902001, EconWPA.
86. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Time consistent monetary policy reconsidered: may we have a deflationary bias too?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0004, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
87. Giuseppe Moscarini, 2007. "Competence Implies Credibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 37-63, March.
88. Christensen, Michael, 2001. "Real supply shocks and the money growth-inflation relationship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 67-72, July.
89. José De Gregorio, 1991. "Indexación versus Credibilidad en un Programa de Estabilización: La Experiencia Chilena a Mediados de los 70," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 28(83), pages 189-199.
90. Alexander Mihailov, 2005. "Has More Independence Affected Bank of England's Reaction Function under Inflation Targeting? Lessons from Taylor Rule Empirics," Economics Discussion Papers 601, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    
    • Alexander Mihailov, 2007. "Does Instrument Independence Matter under the Constrained Discretionof an Inflation Targeting Goal? Lessons from UK Taylor Rule Empirics," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 95, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
91. Philip Schellekens, 2000. "Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy," Working Paper Series 25, European Central Bank.
92. Piga, Gustavo, 1998. "In Search of an Independent Province for the Treasuries: How Should Public Debt Be Managed?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 257-275, May.
93. Jay Bryson & Henrik Jensen & David Hoose, 1993. "Rules, discretion, and international monetary and fiscal policy coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 117-132, June.
94. Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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