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Exchange Rate Stability and Financial Stability

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  • Barry Eichengreen

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Abstract

Historical evidence reveals no monocausal explanation for banking crises, including one which would emphasize the maintenance of a currency peg. To some extent this follows from the standard textbook wisdom: whether fixed or flexible exchange rates are preferable depends on the source of disturbances. If threats to the stability of the banking system come from the “outside,†there is a case for exchange rate flexibility to discourage the banks from relying excessively on external sources of finance and to enhance the capacity of the domestic authorities to act as lenders of last resort. Conversely, if the main threats to the stability of the banking system emanate from “inside†(e.g., erratic monetary policies at home), there is an argument for attempting to peg the exchange rate in order to discipline domestic policymakers and vent shocks via the external sector. From this point of view, it is no surprise that there is no simple correlation between the exchange rate regime and the prevalence of banking crises. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 9 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 569-608

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Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:9:y:1998:i:1:p:569-608

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323

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Keywords: exchange-rate regime; banking crisis; financial stability; lender of last resort;

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References

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  1. Paolo Savona & Aurelio Maccario, 1998. "On the Relation between Money and Derivatives and its Application to the International Monetary Market," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 637-664, January.
  2. Bordo Michael D. & Kydland Finn E., 1995. "The Gold Standard As a Rule: An Essay in Exploration," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 423-464, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Deabes, Tosson, 2003. "How to Reduce the Risk Of Banking Problems," MPRA Paper 3054, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2003.
  2. Domac, Ilker & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad, 2003. "Banking crises and exchange rate regimes: is there a link?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 41-72, October.
  3. della Paolera, Gerardo & Taylor, Alan M., 2002. "Internal versus external convertibility and emerging-market crises: lessons from Argentine history," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 357-389, October.
  4. Alicia García Herrero & Pedro del Río, 2003. "Financial stability and the design of monetary policy," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0315, Banco de Espa�a.
  5. Paolo Savona & Aurelio Maccario, 1998. "On the Relation between Money and Derivatives and its Application to the International Monetary Market," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 637-664, January.
  6. Michele Fratianni & Dominick Salvatore & Paolo Savona, 1998. "Ideas for the Future of the International Monetary System: Conclusions and Remarks," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 689-700, January.
  7. Barry Eichengreen & Andrew K. Rose, 1998. "Staying Afloat When the Wind Shifts: External Factors and Emerging-Market Banking Crises," NBER Working Papers 6370, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Honohan, P. & Lane, P.R., 2000. "Will the Euro Trigger More Monetary Unions in Africa?," Research Paper 176, World Institute for Development Economics Research.
  9. della Paolera, Gerardo & Taylor, Alan M., 1999. "Internal Versus External Convertibility and Developing-Country Financial Crises: Lessons from the Argentine Bank Bailout of the 1930s," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt0dr877fb, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  10. Koichi Hamada, 1998. "The Choice of International Monetary Regimes in a Context of Repeated Games," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 417-446, January.
  11. Alberto Predieri, 1998. "Money Markets and Poliarchic Democratic States," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 713-726, January.
  12. Forrest Capie, 1998. "Monetary Unions in Historical Perspective: What Future for the Euro in the International Financial System," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 447-466, January.
  13. Dominick Salvatore, 1998. "International Monetary and Financial Arrangements: Present and Future," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 375-416, January.
  14. Tyrowicz, Joanna, 2009. "When Eastern Labour Markets Enter Western Europe CEECs. Labour Market Institutions upon Euro Zone Accession," MPRA Paper 15045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Gerardo della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor, 2000. "Internal Versus External Convertibility and Developing-Country Financial," Macroeconomics 0004002, EconWPA.
  16. Aguirre, Maria Sophia & Saidi, Reza, 2004. "Japanese banks liability management before and during the banking crises and macroeconomic fundamentals," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 373-397, April.

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