This article attempts to account for the exceptional stability exhibited by the banking systems of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression. It considers three possible explanations of stability employing data from 25 countries across Europe and North America. The results suggest that macroeconomic policy and banking structure, but not lenders of last resort, were systematically responsible for banking stability.
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Volume (Year): 54 (1994) Issue (Month): 03 (September) Pages: 654-682 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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