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It’s not only WHAT is said, it’s also WHO the speaker is. Evaluating the effectiveness of central bank communication

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  • Marek Rozkrut

Abstract

On the basis of a unique database of policy makers’ comments, we find that central bank communication does influence behavior of financial markets. This effect is asymmetric and depends on the contents and direction of the statements. Moreover, we investigate whether individual characteristics of MPC members may influence their ability to affect the asset prices. We find that market participants are most vigilant to the comments made by policy makers who are relatively reticent, usually win voting and match their words with deeds. Moreover, the impact of statements on financial market behavior depends on whether a speaker represents a hawkish, dovish or neutral faction within the committee. Finally, we provide evidence that central bank communication affects the predictability of monetary policy decisions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute in its series National Bank of Poland Working Papers with number 47.

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Length: 40
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:47

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Related research

Keywords: Monetary policy; Central bank; Transparency; Communication;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Allard, Julien & Catenaro, Marco & Vidal, Jean-Pierre & Wolswijk, Guido, 2012. "Central bank communication on fiscal policy," Working Paper Series 1477, European Central Bank.

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