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Communication and Monetary Policy

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  • Jeffery Amato
  • Stephen Morris
  • Hyun Song Shin

Abstract

One role of monetary policy is to coordinate expectations in the economy and greater transparency of monetary policy may lead to greater coordination. But if transparent monetary policy helps coordinate expectations, then it must also magnify mistakes.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 506439000000000330.

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Date of creation: 20 Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000330

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References

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  1. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Manchester School, University of Manchester, University of Manchester, vol. 67(0), pages 1-35, Supplemen.
  2. Henrik Jensen, . "Optimal Degrees of Tranaparency in Monetary Policymaking," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 01-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Howitt, Peter & McAfee, R Preston, 1992. "Animal Spirits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 493-507, June.
  4. Woodford, Michael, 1990. "Learning to Believe in Sunspots," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 277-307, March.
  5. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  6. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, December.
  7. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
  8. Azariadis, Costas, 1981. "Self-fulfilling prophecies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 380-396, December.
  9. Carol Corrado, 1986. "Reducing uncertainty in current analysis and projections: the estimation of monthly GNP," Special Studies Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 209, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  11. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0026, European Central Bank.
  12. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
  13. Michael Woodford, 2001. "Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
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