Communication and monetary policy
AbstractRecent trends toward greater central bank independence and the adoption of formal inflation targeting by several countries have served to emphasise the importance of communication policy. In this paper, we explore some of the economic effects of public information that arise whenever public information serves the dual role of conveying fundamental information as well as serving as a focal point for better coordination. More precise public information is a double-edged tool. While it is very effective in influencing actions through coordination, sometimes it can be too effective, and coordinate actions away from fundamentals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank for International Settlements in its series BIS Working Papers with number 123.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Communication and monetary policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Stephen Morris & Jeffery D. Amato & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm345, Yale School of Management.
- Jeffery Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000330, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey D. Amado & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1405, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
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