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Los efectos del anuncio de un objetivo de inflación

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  • Juan Ayuso Huertas

    (Banco de España)

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    File URL: ftp://ftp.fundacionsepi.es/InvEcon/paperArchive/Sep1991/v15i3a7.pdf
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    Article provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Economicas.

    Volume (Year): 15 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 627-644

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    Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:15:y:1991:i:3:p:627-644

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    Postal: Investigaciones Economicas Fundación SEPI Quintana, 2 (planta 3) 28008 Madrid Spain
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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January.
    2. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-55, November.
    3. Driffill, John, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information: Some Extensions," CEPR Discussion Papers 159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. D. Backus & J. Driffil, 1998. "Inflation and Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625, David K. Levine.
    8. Robert J. Barro, 1984. "Rules versus Discretion," NBER Working Papers 1473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1987. "Reputational constraints on monetary policy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 141-181, January.
    10. Driffill, John, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information - A Survey," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 288, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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