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Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

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  • Laubach, Thomas

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  • Laubach, Thomas, 2003. "Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 985-1009, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:6:p:985-1009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    2. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January.
    3. Alex Cukierman, 2000. "Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 53-76, March.
    4. Manfred J. M. Neumann, 1997. "Monetary Targeting in Germany," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Iwao Kuroda (ed.), Towards More Effective Monetary Policy, chapter 7, pages 176-210, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1997. "Importing Credibility through Exchange Rate Pegging," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 687-694, May.
    6. Douglas O. Staiger & James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, 1997. "How Precise Are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 195-246, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-455, November.
    8. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    9. Laubach, T. & Posen, A.S., 1997. "Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland," Princeton Essays in International Economics 206, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2014. "Inflation forecast contracts," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 26-40.
    2. Berndt, Antje & Yeltekin, Şevin, 2015. "Monetary policy, bond returns and debt dynamics," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 119-136.
    3. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
    4. Meixing DAI, 2007. "A two-pillar strategy to keep inflation expectations at bay: A basic theoretical framework," Working Papers of BETA 2007-20, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    5. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2006. "Signaling And Commitment: Monetary Versus Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(5), pages 595-624, November.
    6. Dai, Meixing, 2007. "The design of a ‘two-pillar’ monetary policy strategy," MPRA Paper 14403, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
    7. Meixing DAI, 2009. "On the role of money growth targeting under inflation targeting regime," Working Papers of BETA 2009-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    8. Andrea Beccarini, 2017. "Verifying time inconsistency of the ECB monetary policy by means of a regime-switching approach," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 203-227, May.

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