Recent literature on monetary policy has emphasised the role of expectations and the merits of tying them down through credible commitment. However, although always in favour of reaping the benefits of having committed, Central Banks worry about the fact that in real time, it is not always easy to assume that they are in such a position. Decisions need to be taken then, under the assumption of predetermined expectations. We argue that in these circumstances, the provision of clear inflation objectives helps agents understand Central Bank objectives better and is thus beneficial to all.
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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number
118.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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