Central Bank Strategic Forecasting
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Granziera, Eleonora & Jalasjoki, Pirkka & Paloviita, Maritta, 2021. "The bias and efficiency of the ECB inflation projections: a State dependent analysis," Research Discussion Papers 7/2021, Bank of Finland.
- Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2017.
"The Stabilizing Role of Forward Guidance: A Macro Experiment,"
VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking
168063, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2018. "The stabilizing role of forward guidance: A macro experiment," BERG Working Paper Series 137, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
- Eleonora Granziera & Pirkka Jalasjoki & Maritta Paloviita, 2021. "The Bias and Efficiency of the ECB Inflation Projections: a State Dependent Analysis," Working Paper 2021/1, Norges Bank.
- Duffy, John & Heinemann, Frank, 2021.
"Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment: Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 887-903.
- John Duffy & Frank Heinemann, 2016. "Central Bank Reputation, Cheap Talk and Transparency as Substitutes for Commitment: Experimental Evidence," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-053, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- John Duffy & Frank Heinemann, 2016. "Central Bank Reputation, Cheap Talk and Transparency as Substitutes for Commitment: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 161703, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Granziera, Eleonora & Jalasjoki, Pirkka & Paloviita, Maritta, 2021. "The bias and efficiency of the ECB inflation projections: A state dependent analysis," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/2021, Bank of Finland.
- repec:zbw:bofrdp:2021_007 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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