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Central banks and information provided to the private sector

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  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

    ()
    (Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza", Facoltà di Economia, Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Roma (Italy))

  • Enrico Marchetti

    ()
    (Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza", Facoltà di Economia, Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Roma (Italy))

Abstract

This paper examines the information provided to the private sector by centralbanks. By using the principal component analysis, we investigated the variance of the procedural rules followed by nine major central banks about informationtreatments. We investigate problems related to the information coming from thecentral banks by focusing on the quantity and quality perspectives and highlight the methodological complexity of the investigation. We find that a synthetic quantitative index of transparency is not enough to represent the phenomenon since it can result misleading in understanding the behavior of institutionally different central banksassociated with the same index values.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal BNL Quarterly Review.

Volume (Year): 57 (2004)
Issue (Month): 230 ()
Pages: 265-295

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Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:2004:32

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Keywords: Information;

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References

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  1. Alex Cukierman, 2002. "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 15-36.
  2. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
  4. Demertzis, Maria & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2003. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 56, Royal Economic Society.
  5. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
  7. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  8. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  9. Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  10. Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence," Discussion Paper 1998-116, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1991. "The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," CEPR Discussion Papers 551, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Lawler, Phillip, 2001. "Monetary Policy, Central Bank Objectives, and Social Welfare with Strategic Wage Setting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 94-113, January.
  14. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  15. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
  16. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001. "Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ullrich, Katrin, 2007. "Inflation Expectations of Experts and ECB Communication," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-054, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Carbonai, Davide & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2006. "Interlocking directorates as a thrust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry," MPRA Paper 4420, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Di Bartolomeo Anna & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2007. "Integration of migrants in Italy: A simple general and objective measure," wp.comunite 0010, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  4. Maria Demertzis & Andrew Hughes Hallet, 2003. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 105, Netherlands Central Bank.
  5. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," Working Papers 115, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  6. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
  7. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Supply- side Fiscal Policy,Conservativeness, and Central Bank trasparency," Working Papers 77, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  8. Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moïse, 2008. "Central bank's conservativeness and transparency," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 179-187, December.

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