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Interlocking directorates as a thrust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry

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  • Carbonai, Davide
  • Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni

Abstract

This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies’ market shares.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4420/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4420.

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Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4420

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Keywords: Non-life insurance; antitrust; competition; interlocking directorates; network economics;

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  1. Giuseppe Turchetti & Cinzia Daraio, 2004. "How Deregulation Shapes Market Structure and Industry Efficiency: The Case of the Italian Motor Insurance Industry," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, vol. 29(2), pages 202-218, 04.
  2. Giorgio Brunello & Clara Graziano & Bruno Parigi, 1999. "Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 1999.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Page Jr. Frank H & Wooders, Myrna & Kamat, Samir, 2003. "Networks and Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 689, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26.
  5. Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, 2002. "Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects and Inequality," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0217, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  6. Randall Morck & Andrel Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 52, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  7. Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Central Banks and Information Provided to the Private Sector," Macroeconomics, EconWPA 0311009, EconWPA.
  8. Eccles, Robert G., 1981. "The quasifirm in the construction industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-357, December.
  9. Berglof, Erik & Perotti, Enrico, 1994. "The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 259-284, October.
  10. Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
  11. Dooley, Peter C, 1969. "The Interlocking Directorate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 314-23, June.
  12. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
  13. Mintz, Beth A. & Schwartz, Michael, 1985. "The Power Structure of American Business," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 0, number 9780226531083, 01-2013.
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Cited by:
  1. Di Bartolomeo Anna & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2007. "Integration of migrants in Italy: A simple general and objective measure," wp.comunite, Department of Communication, University of Teramo 0010, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.

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