Inflation targeting in the 1990s: the experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom
AbstractWe survey the recent experiences of three industrial countries -- New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom -- that have announced specific targets for inflation. Despite success on the part of the targeting central banks in attaining their inflation goals thus far, bond yields suggest that long-term inflation expectations for these countries persistently tended to exceed long-term targets throughout the first several years of targeting. For New Zealand and Canada, survey data generally implied that inflation also was expected to exceed its targeted level in the near term.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series International Finance Discussion Papers with number 473.
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D. Backus & J. Driffil, 1998.
"Inflation and Reputation,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
625, David K. Levine.
- P Clark & D Laxton, 1997. "Phillips Curves," CEP Discussion Papers dp0344, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984.
"Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985.
"Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Laurence Ball, 1990.
"Why Does High Inflation Raise Inflation Uncertainty?,"
NBER Working Papers
3224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ball, Laurence, 1992. "Why does high inflation raise inflation uncertainty?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 371-388, June.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
- repec:fth:harver:1496 is not listed on IDEAS
- Brayton, Flint & Tinsley, P. A., 1996. "Effective interest rate policies for price stability," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 289-314, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kris Vajs).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.