Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa in its series Insper Working Papers with number wpe_68.
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-EFF-2007-02-17 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-INO-2007-02-17 (Innovation)
- NEP-TID-2007-02-17 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- George A. Kahn & Klara Parrish, 1998. "Conducting monetary policy with inflation targets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q III, pages 5-32.
- Walsh, Carl E, 2000. "Market Discipline and Monetary Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 249-71, April.
- Mauricio S. Bugarin & Fabia A. de Carvalho, 2005.
"Comment on ‘Market discipline and monetary policy’ by Carl Walsh,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 732-739, October.
- Maurício S. Bugarin & Fabia A. de Carvalho, 2005. "Comment on Market Discipline and Monetary Policy by Carl Walsh," Working Papers Series 95, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
- Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001.
"One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?,"
NBER Working Papers
8397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. "One decade of inflation targeting in the world : What do we know and what do we need to know?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 101, Central Bank of Chile.
- Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1991.
"Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 99-127, February.
- Cukierman, A. & Liviatan, N., 1989. "Optimal Accommodation By Strong Policymakers Under Incomplete Information," Papers 13-89, Tel Aviv.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983.
"Monetary policy games and the role of private information,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
- Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-55, November.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Naercio Menezes).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.