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Reputation in repeated second-price auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sanna Laksá & Daniel Marszalec & Alexander Teytelboym, 2018. "Epic Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1096, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  2. Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Pezanis-Christou, Paul & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Selten, Reinhard, 2005. "An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 505-530, February.
  3. Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
  4. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  5. Sushil Bikhchandani & Chi-fu Huang, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-134, Summer.
  6. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2015. "Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria," Post-Print hal-01735849, HAL.
  7. Marco Pagnozzi, 2008. "Are Disadvanteged Bidders Doomed In Ascending Auctions?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 683-683, September.
  8. Gian Albano & Frédéric Jouneau-Sion, 2004. "Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions," TEST: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 13(1), pages 193-211, June.
  9. Griffin, Robert, 2013. "Auction designs for allocating wind energy leases on the U.S. outer continentalshelf," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 603-611.
  10. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
  11. Thomas D. Jeitschko, 1998. "Learning in Sequential Auctions," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 98-112, July.
  12. Nelson, Jon P., 1995. "Market structure and incomplete information: Price formation in a real-world repeated English auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 421-437, August.
  13. Coatney, Kalyn T. & Shaffer, Sherrill L. & Menkhaus, Dale J., 2012. "Auction prices, market share, and a common agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 61-73.
  14. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
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