Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format
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- Mª Angeles De Frutos & Xavier Jarque, 2004. "Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format," Working Papers 146, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jihui Chen & Maochao Xu, 2015. "Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(3), pages 625-640, July.
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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