Private Information in Repeated Auctions
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
- Wang, Ruqu, 1991. "Common-value auctions with discrete private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 429-447, August.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 439-454.
- Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1987.
"Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics,"
442, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1998.
"A Learning Approach to Auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 65-88, September.
- Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
- Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
- Donald B. Hausch, 1986. "Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1599-1610, December.
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