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Common-value auctions with discrete private information


  • Wang, Ruqu


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  • Wang, Ruqu, 1991. "Common-value auctions with discrete private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 429-447, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:54:y:1991:i:2:p:429-447

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Cox, John C. & Huang, Chi-fu., 1989. "A variational problem arising in financial economics," Working papers 2110-89., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J. & Vila, Jean-Luc, 1992. "Optimal Dynamic Trading with Leverage Constraints," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(02), pages 151-168, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matros, Alexander & Possajennikov, Alex, 2016. "Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 74-77.
    2. repec:wsi:wschap:9789814374590_0009 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Valimaki, Juuso, 2017. "All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values," MPRA Paper 80799, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 9, pages 319-356 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Banerjee, Priyodorshi, 2005. "Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 47-53, July.
    6. Rentschler, Lucas & Turocy, Theodore L., 2016. "Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 435-466.
    7. David Malueg & Ram Orzach, 2012. "Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 219-254, May.
    8. Alexander Matros & Alex Possajennikov, 2014. "Common Value Allocation Mechanisms with Private Information: Lotteries or Auctions?," Discussion Papers 2014-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    9. Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison, 2003. "Private Information in Repeated Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000108, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Hong, Han & Shum, Matthew, 2004. "Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 1-40, May.

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