Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions
We study an infinitely-repeated ?rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid- ders receive independent private signals about the objects' value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es- sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players?payo¤s tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re?nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not affect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of collusion without conspiracy.
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