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The Healthy Fright of Losing a Good One for a Bad One

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  • Cristini, Annalisa

    () (University of Bergamo)

  • Origo, Federica

    () (University of Bergamo)

  • Pinoli, Sara

    () (University of Bergamo)

Abstract

In this paper we study the effect of different degrees of employment protection on absenteeism, paying attention to differences between workers moving from protected jobs to insecure jobs, on the one hand, and workers moving from insecure to secure jobs, on the other hand. Using a large representative sample of Italian workers, we show that workers' reaction in terms of sickness leave is not symmetric: losing protection (bad news) is more effective than gaining it (good news). We claim that this asymmetry is consistent with the behavior of financial markets responding to good and bad news. In our case, workers react in a more prudential way to improvements in their employment status ("wait and see" strategy), while they do immediately adjust to worsening job security by showing off healthy behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristini, Annalisa & Origo, Federica & Pinoli, Sara, 2012. "The Healthy Fright of Losing a Good One for a Bad One," IZA Discussion Papers 6348, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6348
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincenzo Scoppa & Daniela Vuri, 2014. "Absenteeism, unemployment and employment protection legislation: evidence from Italy," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, December.
    2. René Böheim & Thomas Leoni, 2014. "Firms' Sickness Costs and Workers' Sickness Absences," NBER Working Papers 20305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    absenteeism; employment protection; delayed reaction;

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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