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Shirking and employment protection legislation: Evidence from a natural experiment

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  • Scoppa, Vincenzo

Abstract

The Italian employment protection legislation was modified in 1990 making more costly for small firms to dismiss employees. Using a difference-in-differences estimator to compare absenteeism rates in small and large firms we find a strong increase of shirking in small firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2010. "Shirking and employment protection legislation: Evidence from a natural experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 276-280, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:276-280
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    1. Andrea Bassanini & Luca Nunziata & Danielle Venn, 2009. "Job protection legislation and productivity growth in OECD countries [Appropriate growth policy: a unifying framework]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 24(58), pages 349-402.
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    11. Barmby, Tim & Sessions, John G & Treble, John G, 1994. " Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 561-566.
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    1. Employment protection effects
      by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2011-01-11 19:43:39

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    1. Vincenzo Scoppa & Daniela Vuri, 2014. "Absenteeism, unemployment and employment protection legislation: evidence from Italy," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, December.
    2. Maria De Paola & Roberto Nisticò & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2020. "Fertility Decisions And Employment Protection: The Unintended Consequences Of The Italian Jobs Act," Working Papers 202003, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    3. Daniel Weimar & Katrin Scharfenkamp, 2019. "Effort reduction of employer‐to‐employer changers: Empirical evidence from football," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(3), pages 277-291, April.
    4. Marco Leonardi & Giovanni Pica, 2013. "Who Pays for it? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(12), pages 1236-1278, December.
    5. Leila Baghdadi & Rihab Bellakhal & Marc-Arthur Diaye, 2016. "Financial Participation: Does the Risk Transfer Story Hold in France?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(1), pages 3-29, March.
    6. Caroline Flammer & Jiao Luo, 2017. "Corporate social responsibility as an employee governance tool: Evidence from a quasi-experiment," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 163-183, February.
    7. Dräger, Vanessa, 2015. "Do Employment Protection Reforms Affect Well-Being?," IZA Discussion Papers 9114, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Steve Bradley & Colin Green & Gareth Leeves, 2014. "Employment Protection, Threat and Incentive Effects on Worker Absence," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 333-358, June.
    9. Inmaculada Garcia & Colin Green & Maria Navarro Paniagua, 2012. "New Estimates of the Effect of Temporary Employment on Absenteeism," Working Papers 24151321, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    10. Maria De Paola & Valeria Pupo & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Absenteeism In The Italian Public Sector: The Effects Of Changes In Sick Leave Compensation," Working Papers 200916, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    11. Gürtzgen, Nicole & Hiesinger, Karolin, 2020. "Dismissal protection and long-term sickness absence: First evidence from Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Andrea Pacella & Riccardo Realfonzo & Guido Tortorella Esposito, 2016. "The Employment Protection Controversy in the Years of Labour Market Reforms (1990-2014)," History of Economic Ideas, Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa - Roma, vol. 24(2), pages 165-196.
    13. Michael Jones, 2015. "How do teachers respond to tenure?," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-19, December.
    14. Cristini, Annalisa & Origo, Federica & Pinoli, Sara, 2017. "The healthy fright of losing a good one for a bad one," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 129-144.
    15. Gürtzgen, Nicole & Hiesinger, Karolin, 2020. "Dismissal Protection and Long-term Sickness Absence - First Evidence from Germany," IAB-Discussion Paper 202022, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Absenteeism Shirking Employment protection legislation Difference-in-differences;

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

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