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Macroprudential policy with capital buffers

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  • Josef Schroth

Abstract

This paper studies optimal bank capital requirements in a model of endogenous bank funding conditions. I find that requirements should be higher during good times such that a macroprudential "buffer" is provided. However, whether banks can use buffers to maintain lending during a financial crisis depends on the capital requirement during the subsequent recovery. The reason is that a high requirement during the recovery lowers bank shareholder value during the crisis and thus creates funding-market pressure to use buffers for deleveraging rather than for maintaining lending. Therefore, buffers are useful if banks are not required to rebuild them quickly.

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  • Josef Schroth, 2019. "Macroprudential policy with capital buffers," BIS Working Papers 771, Bank for International Settlements.
  • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:771
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    Cited by:

    1. Josef Schroth, 2021. "Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies," Staff Working Papers 21-21, Bank of Canada.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial frictions; financial intermediation; regulation; counter-cyclical capital requirements; market discipline; access to funding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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