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Credit crunches from occasionally binding bank borrowing constraints

Listed author(s):
  • Holden, Tom D.
  • Levine, Paul
  • Swarbrick, Jonathan M.

We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the counter-cyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristic of the credit crunches observed in the data.

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File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168441/1/paper.pdf
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Paper provided by ZBW - German National Library of Economics in its series EconStor Preprints with number 168441.

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Date of creation: 2017
Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:168441
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  1. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  3. Dixon, Huw & Pourpourides, Panayiotis M., 2016. "On imperfect competition with occasionally binding cash-in-advance constraints," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 72-85.
  4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  5. Holden, Tom D., 2016. "Computation of solutions to dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints," EconStor Preprints 144569, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
  6. Jeremy C. Stein & Anil K. Kashyap, 2000. "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 407-428, June.
  7. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  8. Altinkilic, Oya & Hansen, Robert S, 2000. "Are There Economies of Scale in Underwriting Fees? Evidence of Rising External Financing Costs," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 191-218.
  9. Abo-Zaid, Salem, 2015. "Optimal long-run inflation with occasionally binding financial constraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 18-42.
  10. Holden, Tom D., 2016. "Existence, uniqueness and computation of solutions to dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints," EconStor Preprints 127430, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
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