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Optimal Capital Regulation

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  • Stéphane Moyen
  • Josef Schroth

Abstract

We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly. As a result, equity requirements are occasionally binding. Constrained-efficient regulation requires banks to build up additional equity buffers and compensates them for the cost of equity with a permanent increase in lending margins. When buffers are depleted, regulation relaxes the market-imposed equity requirements by raising bank future prospects through temporarily elevated lending margins.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Moyen & Josef Schroth, 2017. "Optimal Capital Regulation," Staff Working Papers 17-6, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:17-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. McInerney, Niall & O'Brien, Martin & Wosser, Michael & Zavalloni, Luca, 2022. "Rightsizing Bank Capital for Small, Open Economies," Research Technical Papers 4/RT/22, Central Bank of Ireland.
    2. Schroth, Josef, 2021. "Macroprudential policy with capital buffers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 296-311.
    3. Clancy, Daragh & Merola, Rossana, 2017. "Countercyclical capital rules for small open economies," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 332-351.
    4. Maarten R.C. Van Oordt, 2023. "Calibrating the Magnitude of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer Using Market‐Based Stress Tests," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2-3), pages 465-501, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit and credit aggregates; Financial Institutions; Financial stability; Financial system regulation and policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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