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Rules versus discretion in capital regulation

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  • Jermann, Urban
  • Xiang, Haotian

Abstract

We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion.

Suggested Citation

  • Jermann, Urban & Xiang, Haotian, 2025. "Rules versus discretion in capital regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:169:y:2025:i:c:s0304405x25000686
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060
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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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