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Constrained Efficient Borrowing with Sovereign Default Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Hatchondo
  • Mr. Leonardo Martinez
  • Mr. Francisco Roch

Abstract

Using a quantitative sovereign default model, we characterize constrained efficient borrowing by a Ramsey government that commits to income-history-contingent borrowing paths taking as given ex-post optimal future default decisions. The Ramsey government improves upon the Markov government because it internalizes the effects of borrowing decisions in period t on borrowing opportunities prior to t. We show the effect of borrowing decisions in t on utility flows prior to t can be encapsulated by two single dimensional variables. Relative to a Markov government, the Ramsey government distorts borrowing decisions more when bond prices are more sensitive to borrowing, and changes in bond prices have a larger effect on past utility. In a quantitative exercise, more than 80% of the default risk is eliminated by a Ramsey government, without decreasing borrowing. The Ramsey government also has a higher probability of completing a successful deleveraging (without defaulting), while smoothing out the fiscal consolidation.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Mr. Francisco Roch, 2020. "Constrained Efficient Borrowing with Sovereign Default Risk," IMF Working Papers 2020/227, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2020/227
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    Cited by:

    1. Esquivel, Carlos, 2024. "Underinvestment and capital misallocation under sovereign risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    2. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo & Önder, Yasin Kürşat & Roch, Francisco, 2025. "Sovereign CoCos and debt forgiveness," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    3. Jermann, Urban & Xiang, Haotian, 2025. "Rules versus discretion in capital regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    4. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo & Roch, Francisco, 2022. "Numerical fiscal rules for economic unions: The role of sovereign spreads," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    5. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Cesar Sosa Padilla, 2020. "Sovereign Debt Standstills," IMF Working Papers 2020/290, International Monetary Fund.
    6. de Ferra, Sergio & Mallucci, Enrico, 2022. "Sovereign risk matters: Endogenous default risk and the time-varying volatility of interest rate spreads," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    7. Mateos-Planas, Xavier & McCrary, Sean & Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor & Wicht, Adrien, 2025. "Commitment in the canonical sovereign default model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    8. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Kursat Onder & Mr. Francisco Roch, 2022. "Sovereign Cocos," IMF Working Papers 2022/078, International Monetary Fund.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Yasin Kürsat Önder & Francisco Roch, 2022. "Sovereign Cocos," Working Papers 139, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    9. Mr. Julien Acalin & Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Mr. Francisco Roch, 2025. "Fiscal Rules, Robust Correction Mechanisms, and Sovereign Spreads," IMF Working Papers 2025/195, International Monetary Fund.

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    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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