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An indifference trap of voting

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  • Manfred Holler

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  • Manfred Holler, 1988. "An indifference trap of voting," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 279-292, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:22:y:1988:i:3:p:279-292
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00183541
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Wittman, Donald, 1985. "Counter-intuitive results in game theory," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 77-89.
    3. Manfred Holler, 1980. "What is paradoxical about the voting paradox?," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 679-685, October.
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