IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v103y2018icp239-254.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can public works increase equilibrium wages? Evidence from India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee

Author

Listed:
  • Berg, Erlend
  • Bhattacharyya, Sambit
  • Rajasekhar, D.
  • Manjula, R.

Abstract

We estimate the impact of the world’s largest public works program, India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), on agricultural wages. NREGS was rolled out across India in three distinct phases, and this phased introduction is used to identify difference-in-difference estimates of the program effect. Using monthly data on wage rates from the period 2000–2011 in 209 districts across 18 Indian states, we include district-specific fixed effects and trends to control for differences in wage rates in the absence of the program. We find that, on average, the program boosted the growth rate of real daily agricultural wages by 4.3% per year. The effect of the scheme is more consistent with an increase in the growth rate of wages than with a discontinuous jump in wages. The effect was concentrated in some states and in the agricultural peak season, appears to have been gender-neutral and was biased towards unskilled labor. Since many of the world’s poorest depend on casual agricultural labor for their livelihood, while at the same time minimum-wage legislation is unlikely to be effective in many developing countries, we argue that rural public employment programs constitute a potentially important anti-poverty policy tool.

Suggested Citation

  • Berg, Erlend & Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Rajasekhar, D. & Manjula, R., 2018. "Can public works increase equilibrium wages? Evidence from India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 239-254.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:103:y:2018:i:c:p:239-254
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.027
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X15311335
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.027?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Niehaus & Sandip Sukhtankar, 2013. "Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 230-269, November.
    2. Basu, Arnab K. & Chau, Nancy H. & Kanbur, Ravi, 2009. "A theory of employment guarantees: Contestability, credibility and distributional concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 482-497, April.
    3. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-377, May.
    4. van de Walle, Dominique, 1998. "Targeting Revisited," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 13(2), pages 231-248, August.
    5. Clément Imbert & John Papp, 2015. "Labor Market Effects of Social Programs: Evidence from India's Employment Guarantee," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 233-263, April.
    6. Rao, V.M., 1972. ""Agricultural Wages in India" -A Reliability Analysis," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 27(3), pages 1-26.
    7. Angus Deaton and Jean Drèze & Jean Drèze, 2002. "Poverty and Inequality in India: A Reexamination," Working papers 107, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    8. Niehaus, Paul & Sukhtankar, Sandip, 2013. "The marginal rate of corruption in public programs: Evidence from India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 52-64.
    9. Jha, Raghbendra & Bhattacharyya, Sambit & Gaiha, Raghav, 2011. "Social safety nets and nutrient deprivation: An analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program and the Public Distribution System in India," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 189-201, April.
    10. Peter Lanjouw & Rinku Murgai, 2009. "Poverty decline, agricultural wages, and nonfarm employment in rural India: 1983–2004," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 243-263, March.
    11. Subbarao,Kalanidhi, 2003. "Systemic shocks and social protection : role and effectiveness of public works programs," Policy Research Working Paper Series 25606, The World Bank.
    12. World Bank, 2015. "The State of Social Safety Nets 2015," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 22101, December.
    13. Dutta, Puja & Murgai, Rinku & Ravallion., Martin & van de Walle, Dominique, 2012. "Does India's employment guarantee scheme guarantee employment ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6003, The World Bank.
    14. World Bank, 2011. "Social Protection for a Changing India : Executive Summary," World Bank Publications - Reports 2746, The World Bank Group.
    15. Raghav Gaiha, 1997. "Do rural public works influence agricultural wages? The case of the employment guarantee scheme in India," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(3), pages 301-314.
    16. Zimmermann, Laura V, 2012. "Labor Market Impacts of a Large-Scale Public Works Program: Evidence from the Indian Employment Guarantee Scheme," IZA Discussion Papers 6858, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-261, March.
    18. Ravallion, Martin & Datt, Gaurav & Chaudhuri, Shubham, 1993. "Does Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment? Effects of the 1988 Wage Increase," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 251-275, January.
    19. Klonner, Stefan & Oldiges , Christian, 2014. "Safety Net for India's Poor or Waste of Public Funds? Poverty and Welfare in the Wake of the World's Largest Job Guarantee Program," Working Papers 0564, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    20. Khera, Reetika (ed.), 2011. "The Battle for Employment Guarantee," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198070627, Decembrie.
    21. Dey, S., 2010. "Evaluating India's national rural employment guarantee scheme," ISS Working Papers - General Series 18703, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    22. Arnab Basu, 2013. "Impact of rural employment guarantee schemes on seasonal labor markets: optimum compensation and workers’ welfare," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 11(1), pages 1-34, March.
    23. World Bank, 2011. "Social Protection for a Changing India : Main Report," World Bank Publications - Reports 2745, The World Bank Group.
    24. Subbarao, Kalanidhi, 2003. "Systemic shocks and social protection : role and effectiveness of public works programs," Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 25606, The World Bank.
    25. Farzana Afridi & Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay & Soham Sahoo, 2016. "Female labor force participation and child education in India: evidence from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme," IZA Journal of Labor & Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-27, December.
    26. Azam, Mehtabul, 2012. "The Impact of Indian Job Guarantee Scheme on Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 6548, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Klonner, Stefan & Oldiges, Christian, 2022. "The welfare effects of India’s rural employment guarantee," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    2. repec:bri:cmpowp:13/317 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Erlend Berg & Sambit Bhattacharyya & D Rajasekhar & R Manjula, 2014. "Can Public Employment Schemes Increase Equilibrium Wages? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 14/317, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    4. Merfeld, Joshua D., 2019. "Spatially heterogeneous effects of a public works program," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 151-167.
    5. Deininger, Klaus & Liu, Yanyan, 2019. "Heterogeneous welfare impacts of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Evidence from Andhra Pradesh, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 98-111.
    6. Misra, Kartik, 2019. "Does historical land inequality attenuate the positive impact of India’s employment guarantee program?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-1.
    7. Klonner, Stefan & Oldiges , Christian, 2014. "Safety Net for India's Poor or Waste of Public Funds? Poverty and Welfare in the Wake of the World's Largest Job Guarantee Program," Working Papers 0564, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    8. Merfeld, Joshua D, 2017. "Spatially Heterogeneous Effects of a Public Works Program," MPRA Paper 80630, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Karthik Muralidharan & Paul Niehaus & Sandip Sukhtankar, 2023. "General Equilibrium Effects of (Improving) Public Employment Programs: Experimental Evidence From India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1261-1295, July.
    10. Parmar, Divya & Banerjee, Aneesh, 2019. "Impact of an employment guarantee scheme on utilisation of maternal healthcare services: Results from a natural experiment in India," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 222(C), pages 285-293.
    11. Bahal, Girish & Shrivastava, Anand, 2021. "Supply variabilities in public workfares," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    12. Narayanan, Sudha & Das, Upasak & Liu, Yanyan & Barrett, Christopher B., 2017. "The “Discouraged Worker Effect” in Public Works Programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 31-44.
    13. Sheahan, Megan & Liu, Yanyan & Narayanan, Sudha & Barrett, Christopher B., 2015. "Disaggregated labor supply implications of guaranteed employment in India," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 237345, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    14. Alik-Lagrange, Arthur & Ravallion, Martin, 2018. "Workfare versus transfers in rural India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 244-258.
    15. Clément Imbert & John Papp, 2015. "Labor Market Effects of Social Programs: Evidence from India's Employment Guarantee," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 233-63, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public works; Wages; NREGA; National Rural Employment Guarantee; Asia; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:103:y:2018:i:c:p:239-254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.