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Emissions trading with profit-neutral permit allocations

Listed author(s):
  • Hepburn, Cameron J.
  • Quah, John K.-H.
  • Ritz, Robert A.

This paper examines the impact of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) on equilibrium emissions, output, price, market concentration, and profits in a generalized Cournot model. We develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to be freely allocated to firms to neutralize the profit impact of the ETS. We show that its profit impact is usually limited: in a Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs, total industry profits are preserved so long as freely allocated permits cover a fraction of initial emissions that does not exceed the industry's Herfindahl index.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272712001120
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 98 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 85-99

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:98:y:2013:i:c:p:85-99
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.10.004
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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