Gas release and transport capacity investment as instruments to foster competition in gas markets
Motivated by policy events experienced during the last two decades by the European natural gas industry, this paper develops a simple model for analyzing the interaction between gas release and capacity investment programs as tools to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive markets. We consider a regional market in which a measure that has an incumbent release part of its gas to a marketer complements a program of investment in transport capacity dedicated to imports by the marketer, at a regulated transport charge, of competitively-priced gas. First, we examine the case where transport capacity is regulated while gas release is not, i.e., the volume of gas released is determined by the incumbent. We then analyze the effect of the “artificial” duopoly created by the regulator when the latter regulates both gas release and transport capacity. Finally, using information on the French industry, we calibrate the basic demand and cost elements of the model and perform some simulations of these two scenarios. Besides allowing us to analyze the economic properties of these scenarios, a policy implication that comes out of the empirical analysis is that, when combined with network expansion investments, gas-release measures applied under regulatory control are indeed effective short-term policies for promoting gas-to-gas competition.
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- Cremer, Helmuth & Gasmi, Farid & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Access to Pipelines in Competitive Gas Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 5-33, July.
- Gang Liu, 2004. "Estimating Energy Demand Elasticities for OECD Countries. A Dynamic Panel Data Approach," Discussion Papers 373, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Cédric Clastres & Laurent David, 2009. "The impact of asymmetric regulation on surplus and welfare : the case of gas release programmes," Post-Print halshs-00442213, HAL.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/11509 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716.
- Farid Gasmi & Juan Daniel Oviedo, 2012. "Controlling regional monopolies in the natural gas industry: the role of transport capacity," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 010073, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
- Cédric Clastres & Laurent David, 2009. "The impact of asymmetric regulation on surplus and welfare: the case of gas release programmes," OPEC Energy Review, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, vol. 33(2), pages 97-110, 06.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2002. "Competition in gas markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 928-935, May.
- Gasmi, Farid & Oviedo, Juan Daniel, 2010. "Investment in transport infrastructure, regulation, and gas-gas competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 726-736, May.
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