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Investment in transport infrastructure, regulation, and gas-gas competition

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  • Gasmi, Farid
  • Oviedo, Juan Daniel

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model in which a regulated (upstream) transporter provides capacity to a marketer competing in output with an incumbent in the (downstream) gas commodity market. The equilibrium outcome of the firms' interaction in the downstream market is explicitly taken into account by the regulator when setting the transport charge. We consider various forms of competition in this market and derive the corresponding optimal transport charge policies. We then run simulations that allow us to perform a comparative welfare analysis of these transport infrastructure investment policies based on different assumptions about the intensity of the competition that prevails in the gas commodity market.

Suggested Citation

  • Gasmi, Farid & Oviedo, Juan Daniel, 2010. "Investment in transport infrastructure, regulation, and gas-gas competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 726-736, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:32:y:2010:i:3:p:726-736
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bouwmeester, Maaike & Scholtens, Bert, 2014. "Cross-border spillovers from European gas infrastructure investment," Research Report 14028-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    2. Bermúdez, Alfredo & González-Díaz, Julio & González-Diéguez, Francisco J. & González-Rueda, Ángel M., 2016. "Gas transmission networks in Europe: Connections between different entry-exit tariff methodologies," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 839-851.
    3. Chaton, Corinne & Gasmi, Farid & Guillerminet, Marie-Laure & Oviedo, Juan-Daniel, 2012. "Gas release and transport capacity investment as instruments to foster competition in gas markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 1251-1258.
    4. Alessandro Fiorini & Antonio Sileo, 2013. "Infrastructural equip ment and regulati on. Key interv entions for sustaining security and development of the Italian natural gas market," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2013(1), pages 23-40.
    5. Brandão, António & Soares, Isabel & Sarmento, Paula & Resende, Joana & Pinho, Joana, 2014. "Regulating international gas transport: Welfare effects of postage stamp and entry–exit systems," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 86-95.
    6. Capece, Guendalina & Cricelli, Livio & Di Pillo, Francesca & Levialdi, Nathan, 2012. "New regulatory policies in Italy: Impact on financial results, on liquidity and profitability of natural gas retail companies," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 90-98.
    7. Farid Gasmi & Juan Daniel Oviedo, 2012. "Controlling regional monopolies in the natural gas industry: the role of transport capacity," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 010073, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
    8. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Joana Resende & Paula Sarmento & Isabel Soares, 2016. "Welfare effects of unbundling under different regulatory regimes in natural gas markets," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 15(2), pages 99-127, August.
    9. Ben Ammar, Semir & Eling, Martin, 2015. "Common risk factors of infrastructure investments," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 257-273.
    10. repec:eee:enepol:v:107:y:2017:i:c:p:371-380 is not listed on IDEAS

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