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Citations for "Who Wants a Good Reputation?"

by George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2009. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," IDEI Working Papers 564, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2004. "Selling Reputation When Going out of Business, June 2004," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Costa, Luis Almeida e & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2008. "Share the Fame or Share the Blame? The Reputational Implications of Partnerships," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp539, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  4. Guillermo Ordonez, 2005. "Don't Ask Why Things Went Wrong: Nested Reputation and Scapegoating Inefficiency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000988, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, 2008. "Reputation and competition: evidence from the credit rating industry," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-051, Harvard Business School, revised Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also Forget?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  7. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Andrea Ichino & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Diskussionsschriften dp0319, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Prasanna Gai & Kang-yong Tan, 2004. "Good Housekeeping? Reputation, Fixed Exchange Rates, and the 'Original Sin' Problem," Working Papers 082004, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Rafael Rob, 2004. "Is Bigger Better? Investing in Reputation," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000086, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Observability and Sorting in a Market for Names," Working Papers 08-25, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2003. "Contratti Incompleti Ed Enforcement Endogeno. Una Rassegna Della Letteratura
    [Incomplete Contracts and Endogenous Enforcement. A Survey]    ," MPRA Paper 17284, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 318, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Francisco J. Ledesma & Manuel Navarro & Jorge V. Pérez-Rodríguez, . "Return to Tourist Destination. Is it Reputation, After All?," Working Papers on International Economics and Finance 03-01, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2004. "Something to Prove: Reputation in teams and hiring to introduce uncertainty," Working Papers 04-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Johannes Hörner, . ""Reputation and Competition''," CARESS Working Papres 99-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  19. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition," Wallis Working Papers WP41, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Guillermo Ordonez, 2008. "Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002250, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  21. Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2004. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Working Papers 859, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2004. "Selling Reputation When Going out of Business," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-52, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  23. Gavin Cameron & Kang Yong Tan & Prasanna Gai, 2006. "Sovereign Risk in the Classical Gold Standard Era," Economics Series Working Papers 258, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Bernardita Vial, 2008. "Competitive Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring," Documentos de Trabajo 327, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  25. Heski Bar-Isaac & Juanjo Ganuza, 2005. "Teaching to the top and searching for superstars," Working Papers 05-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  26. Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Christopher Phelan, 2001. "Public trust and government betrayal," Staff Report 283, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  28. Max Blouin & Jean-Marc Bourgeon, 2008. "Practices," Cahiers de recherche 0805, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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  29. Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods," Discussion Paper Series dp349, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  30. Fishman, Arthur & Finkelshtain, Israel & Simhon, Avi & Yacouel, Nira, 2008. "The Economics of Collective Brands," Discussion Papers 46056, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
  31. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  32. repec:att:wimass:1920217 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2006. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay," Working Papers 06-32, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  34. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  35. Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2006. "Observable Reputation Trading," Discussion Papers 131, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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    • Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2007. "Observable Reputation Trading," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 693-730, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000152, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.