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The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise

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  • Silva, Francisco

Abstract

Experts who rely heavily on their network of clients to provide good advice tend to suggest instead that their expertise is due to their technical knowledge. I show how doubt over the experts' source of expertise might not only help these experts but also their clients. Furthermore, I show how it is possible for them to sustain such doubt indefinitely even when their clients have rational expectations.

Suggested Citation

  • Silva, Francisco, 2022. "The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 379-388.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:379-388
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imperfect monitoring; Dynamic cheap talk; Experts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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