Becoming a bad doctor
AbstractWe analyze a market with n rational firms (doctors) and a continuum of boundedly rational consumers (patients). Following Spiegler (2006a), we assume that patients are not familiar with the market and rely on anecdotes. We analyze the price setting game played by doctors with given, different healing qualities. Doctors know their own quality, as well as the qualities of their competitors. In the unique equilibrium all doctors, no matter how bad, earn positive profits.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 80 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Bounded rationality; S(1) procedure; Product differentiation; Price dispersion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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