IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/r2msa.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Internationalizing Like China

Author

Listed:
  • Clayton, Christopher
  • Santos, Amanda Dos
  • Maggiori, Matteo
  • Schreger, Jesse

Abstract

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing the Renminbi by selectively opening up its domestic bond market and propose a dynamic reputation model to understand China's internationalization strategy. While previously closed to foreign investors, China has recently allowed major increases in foreign investment in its domestic bond market. China carefully controlled the entrance of foreign investors into its market, first allowing in relatively stable long-term investors like central banks before allowing in flightier investors like mutual funds. Foreign investors increasingly treat Renminbi denominated assets as a substitute for safe developed-market government bonds. Our framework explains these patterns as the result of a government strategy to build its reputation as an international currency issuer while minimizing the cost of potential capital flight as it gains credibility. We analyze optimal two-way liberalization: gradually letting more domestic capital flow abroad as foreigners increase their participation in domestic markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Clayton, Christopher & Santos, Amanda Dos & Maggiori, Matteo & Schreger, Jesse, 2022. "Internationalizing Like China," SocArXiv r2msa, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:r2msa
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/r2msa
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/622b88ed53a4e802b3515e3e/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/r2msa?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Matteo Maggiori & Brent Neiman & Jesse Schreger, 2020. "International Currencies and Capital Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(6), pages 2019-2066.
    2. Horn, Sebastian & Reinhart, Carmen M. & Trebesch, Christoph, 2021. "China's overseas lending," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Antonio Coppola & Matteo Maggiori & Brent Neiman & Jesse Schreger, 2021. "Redrawing the Map of Global Capital Flows: The Role of Cross-Border Financing and Tax Havens," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(3), pages 1499-1556.
    5. Trebesch, Christoph & Gelpern, Anna & Horn, Sebastian & Morris, Scott & Parks, Bradley, 2021. "How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments," CEPR Discussion Papers 16331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    7. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
    8. Emmanuel Farhi & Matteo Maggiori, 2018. "A Model of the International Monetary System," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(1), pages 295-355.
    9. Javier Bianchi & Guido Lorenzoni, 2021. "The Prudential Use of Capital Controls and Foreign Currency Reserves," NBER Working Papers 29476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 415-441.
    11. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
    12. Zhiguo He & Arvind Krishnamurthy & Konstantin Milbradt, 2019. "A Model of Safe Asset Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1230-1262, April.
    13. Gita Gopinath & Jeremy C Stein, 2021. "Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(2), pages 783-830.
    14. Hanno Lustig & Nikolai Roussanov & Adrien Verdelhan, 2011. "Common Risk Factors in Currency Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(11), pages 3731-3777.
    15. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2014. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(5), pages 1557-1614, September.
    16. Bahaj, Saleem, 2020. "Jumpstarting an International Currency," CEPR Discussion Papers 14793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    18. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    19. Zheng Song & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2011. "Growing Like China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 196-233, February.
    20. Forbes, Kristin J. & Warnock, Francis E., 2012. "Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 235-251.
    21. Eichengreen, Barry, 2012. "Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199642472.
    22. Susan Athey & Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2005. "The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1431-1475, September.
    23. Phelan, Christopher, 2006. "Public trust and government betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 27-43, September.
    24. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    25. Saleem Bahaj & Ricardo Reis, 2022. "Central Bank Swap Lines: Evidence on the Effects of the Lender of Last Resort [Bias-Corrected Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 1654-1693.
    26. Manuel Amador & Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2006. "Commitment vs. Flexibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 365-396, March.
    27. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2016. "A Theory of Macroprudential Policies in the Presence of Nominal Rigidities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1645-1704, September.
    28. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2016. "Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity, Currency Pegs, and Involuntary Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1466-1514.
    29. Barry Eichengreen & Arnaud Mehl & Livia Chitu, 2017. "How Global Currencies Work: Past, Present, and Future," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 11124.
    30. Gita Gopinath & Jeremy C Stein, 0. "Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 136(2), pages 783-830.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Colin Weiss, 2022. "Geopolitics and the U.S. Dollar's Future as a Reserve Currency," International Finance Discussion Papers 1359, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Cortina Lorente,Juan Jose & Martinez Peria,Maria Soledad & Schmukler,Sergio L. & Xiao,Jasmine, 2023. "The Internationalization of China’s Equity Markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10513, The World Bank.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Hélène Rey & Maxime Sauzet, 2019. "The International Monetary and Financial System," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 859-893, August.
    2. Pierre Olivier Gourinchas, 2023. "International Macroeconomics: From the Great Financial Crisis to COVID-19, and Beyond," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 71(1), pages 1-34, March.
    3. Qingmin Liu, 2006. "Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics," Discussion Papers 06-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Tao Liu & Dong Lu & Liang Wang, 2023. "Hegemony or Harmony? A Unified Framework for the International Monetary System," Working Papers 202305, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    5. Matteo Maggiori & Brent Neiman & Jesse Schreger, 2019. "The Rise of the Dollar and Fall of the Euro as International Currencies," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 109, pages 521-526, May.
    6. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
    7. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
    8. Maggiori, Matteo, 2021. "International Macroeconomics With Imperfect Financial Markets," SocArXiv z8g6r, Center for Open Science.
    9. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    10. Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2011. "Sustainable reputations with rating systems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 479-503, March.
    11. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 451-480.
    12. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    13. Ethan Ilzetzki & Carmen M Reinhart & Kenneth S Rogoff, 2020. "Why is the euro punching below its weight?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 35(103), pages 405-460.
    14. Zhengyang Jiang & Arvind Krishnamurthy & Hanno Lustig, 2021. "Foreign Safe Asset Demand and the Dollar Exchange Rate," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1049-1089, June.
    15. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
    16. David K. Levine, 2021. "The Reputation Trap," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2659-2678, November.
    17. Phelan, Christopher, 2006. "Public trust and government betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 27-43, September.
    18. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    19. Javier Bianchi & Saki Bigio & Charles Engel, 2021. "Scrambling for Dollars: International Liquidity, Banks and Exchange Rates," Working Papers 786, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    20. Waki, Yuichiro & Dennis, Richard & Fujiwara, Ippei, 2018. "The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:r2msa. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.