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Bankruptcy: Is it enough to forgive or must we also forget? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ronel Elul
Piero Gottardi
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In many countries, lenders are not permitted to use information about past defaults after a specified period of time has elapsed. The authors model this provision and determine conditions under which it is optimal. ; They develop a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek external funds to finance a sequence of risky projects under conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard. They show that forgetting a default makes incentives worse, ex-ante, because it reduces the punishment for failure. However, following a default it is generally good to forget, because pooling riskier agents with safer ones makes exerting high effort to preserve their reputation more attractive. ; The authors' key result is that if agents are sufficiently patient, and low effort is not too inefficient, then the optimal law would prescribe some amount of forgetting --- that is, it would not permit lenders to fully utilize past information. The authors also show that such a law must be enforced by the government - no lender would willingly agree to forget. Finally, they also use their model to examine the policy debate that arose during the adoption of these rules. ; Also issued as: Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 07-05
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Paper Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008.
"Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget? ,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2008/41, European University Institute.
[Downloadable!] Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008.
"Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also Forget? ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Piero Gottardi & Ronel Elul, 2007.
"Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must we Also Forget? ,"
Working Papers
2007_23, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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"Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment ,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking ,
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