Political Booms, Financial Crises
AbstractCredit booms seem to be among the main predictors of financial crises. We find that, in emerging economies, political booms measured by increases in incumbents' popularity are important predictors too, not only of financial crises but of economic crises more generally. We propose a model in which governments concerned about their reputation and popularity ride the benefits of credit booms and delay corrective actions to prevent crises. We discuss the policy implication of the model and the consistency of its testable implications with data.
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Date of creation: 2013
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