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Citations for "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement"

by Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean.

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  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2010. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000488, www.najecon.org.
  2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," ESE Discussion Papers 109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  3. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Maderner, Nina, 1998. "Are Two a Good Representative for Many?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 90-104, November.
  4. Roland Strausz, 2009. "Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2638, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stéphane, 2008. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 421-442, March.
  6. MOIZEAU, Fabien & MARIOTTI, Thomas & AURAY, Stéphane, 2007. "Dynamic Regulation of Public Good Quality," 2007 Meeting Papers 335, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Nina Maderner, 2001. "Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 343-360, August.
  8. Fiocco, Raffaele & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 9928, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
  10. Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Julie Ing, 2012. "The impact of commitment on nonrenewable resources management with asymmetric information on costs," Working Papers halshs-00690896, HAL.
  12. Julie Ing, 2016. "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 16/263, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  13. Joskow, P.L., 2006. "Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0607, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  14. Jon Strand, 1994. "Environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(5), pages 495-509, October.
  15. Kumar, Praveen & Langberg, Nisan, 2013. "Information manipulation and rational investment booms and busts," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 408-425.
  16. Strausz, Roland, 2005. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 40, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  17. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1393, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Persons, John C., 1997. "Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 269-306, October.
  19. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank.
  20. Zhao, Rui R., 2006. "Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 263-281, November.
  21. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
  22. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  23. Lam, Kit-Chun & Liu, Pak-Wai, 2000. "Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 449-462, July.
  24. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
  25. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
  26. Julie Ing, 2012. "The impact of commitment on nonrenewable resources management with asymmetric information on costs," Working Papers 1205, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  27. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October.
  28. Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2011. "Dynamic regulation of quality," Post-Print halshs-00607190, HAL.
  29. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
  30. Daniel Krämer & Roland Strausz, 2009. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning," Papers 036, Departmental Working Papers.
  31. Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June.
  32. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
  33. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Soenje Reiche, 2003. "Dynamic Yardstick Regulation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 459, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  34. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2014. "Market power and regulation (scientific background)," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  35. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  36. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 457, August.
  37. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  38. Retsef Levi & Martin Pál & Robin O. Roundy & David B. Shmoys & Ravi Subramanian & Xinxin Hu & Gad Allon & Felipe Caro & Holly S. Lutze, 2005. "The MSOM Society Student Paper Competition: Extended Abstracts of 2004 Winners," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 81-99.
  39. Michiel Bijlsma & Gijsbert Zwart, 2013. "Optimal bail-out policies under renegotiation," CPB Discussion Paper 261, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  40. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  41. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015. "Optimal auction design under non-commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
  42. Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, EconWPA.
  43. Osano, Hiroshi, 1998. "Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 207-230, October.
  44. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
  45. Robert Evans & Sonje Reiche, 2013. "Mechanism Design and Non-Cooperative Renegotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1331, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  46. Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000067, UCLA Department of Economics.
  47. Robert M. Bushman & Abbie Smith, 2003. "Transparency, financial accounting information, and corporate governance," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 65-87.
  48. Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," Discussion Papers 1135, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  49. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Sonje Reiche, 2003. "Dynamic yardstick regulation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19319, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  50. Plambeck, Erica L. & Taylor, Terry A., 2004. "Partnership in a Dynamic Production System," Research Papers 1892, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  51. Carlos Pombo, 2002. "Regulación de monopolios naturales con información asimétrica: Una introducción," BORRADORES DE INVESTIGACIÓN 003442, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
  52. Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contract design and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-176, January.
  53. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, 2007. "Implications of Breach Remedy and Renegotiation Design for Innovation and Capacity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(12), pages 1859-1871, December.
  54. Neri, Marcelo Cortes & Xerez, Marcelo, 2004. "Aspectos dinâmicos de um sistema de metas sociais," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 563, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  55. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2000. "Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 165-171, November.
  56. Ben White & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 765-787, April.
  57. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 5014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  58. Neri, Marcelo Cortes & Xerez, Marcelo, 2003. "Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 519, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  59. Felipe Balmaceda, . "Compensation Methods in Competitive Labor Markets," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv118, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  60. Huric Larsen, J.F., 2012. "Public firm incentives under asymmetric information and prospect of deregulation and privatization," MPRA Paper 39351, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  61. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
  62. Mourad Afif & Sandrine Spaeter, 2010. "Adverse Selection, Emission Permits and Optimal Price Differentiation," Working Papers of BETA 2010-07, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  63. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Reiche, Sönje Kerrin, 2003. "Dynamic Yardstick Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  64. Lin, Shi-Woei, 2010. "Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 528-534, May.
  65. Faure-Grimaud, A. & Reiche, S., 2006. "Dynamic yardstick mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 316-335, February.
  66. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2010. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 303, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  67. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, 2006. "Partnership in a Dynamic Production System with Unobservable Actions and Noncontractible Output," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(10), pages 1509-1527, October.
  68. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet, 2000. "original papers : Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 1-21.
  69. Fudenberg, Drew, 2015. "Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics," Scholarly Articles 27303657, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  70. Graziano, Clara, 1995. "Cost observability and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 359-372, December.
  71. Felipe Balmaceda, 2002. "Compensation Methods in a Competitive Labor Market: the Role of Asymmetric Information," Documentos de Trabajo 139, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  72. Wenqiang Xiao & Yi Xu, 2012. "The Impact of Royalty Contract Revision in a Multistage Strategic R&D Alliance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(12), pages 2251-2271, December.
  73. Roland Strausz, . "Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships," Papers 014, Departmental Working Papers.
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