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Desenho de um Sistema de Metas Sociais


  • Marcelo Côrtes Néri


  • Marcelo Casal Xerez



This paper discusses the economic rationality of a system of social targets, as a way for the federal government to increase efficiency in the use of its social budget transferred to municipalities. The paper develops extensions of a standard principal-agent framework in various directions including static models with and without imperfect information. The results of the static models show that the use of the standard focalization criteria where the poorest municipalities get more resources may lead to adverse incentives to poverty eradication. We also show that unconditional transfers from the federal government crowds-out local social expenditures. This paper argues in favor of the use of contracts where the greater the improvement in relevant social indicators, the more resources each municipality would receive. The introduction of imperfect information in the model basically generates a penalty to the poor segments in areas where local governments are less averse to poverty. An advantage of the contract with social targets is to reduce the problem of political favoritism when certain social groups receive greater, or smaller, attention from specific governments. With the establishment of social targets it becomes possible to generate proper incentives, so that social spending is distributed more equitably among groups.
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  • Marcelo Côrtes Néri & Marcelo Casal Xerez, 2003. "Desenho de um Sistema de Metas Sociais," Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31th Brazilian Economics Meeting] b18, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2003:b18

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 901-926, June.
    2. Neri, Marcelo Cortes & Costa, Daniela Ribeiro da, 2002. "O tempo das crianças," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 468, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625.
    4. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
    5. André Minella & Paulo Springer de Freitas & Ilan Goldfajn & Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos, 2003. "Inflation targeting in Brazil: lessons and challenges," BIS Papers chapters,in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Monetary policy in a changing environment, volume 19, pages 106-133 Bank for International Settlements.
    6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    7. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Inflation Targeting in Emerging-Market Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 105-109, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fernando Barbosa & Alexandre Cunha & Elvia Sallum, 2006. "Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 181-195, September.
    2. Neri, Marcelo Cortes & Xerez, Marcelo, 2004. "Aspectos dinâmicos de um sistema de metas sociais," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 563, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    3. Athayde, Gustavo M. de & Flôres Junior, Renato Galvão, 2004. "Do higher moments really matter in portfolio choice?," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 574, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    4. Horowitz, Andrew W. & Flôres Junior, Renato Galvão, 2004. "Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 576, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    5. Buchmann, Gabriel & Neri, Marcelo Cortes, 2008. "From dakar to Brasilia: monitoring unesco´s education goals," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 685, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    6. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004. "Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 300, Econometric Society.

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