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Leveraged Buyouts : A Survey of the Literature

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  • Renneboog, Luc

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Vansteenkiste, Cara

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper provides an exhaustive literature review of the motives for public-to-private LBO transactions. First, the paper develops the theoretical framework for the potential sources of value creation from going private: a distinction is made between the reduction in agency costs, stakeholder wealth transfers, tax benefits, transaction costs savings, takeover defense strategies, and corporate undervaluation. The paper then reviews and summarizes whether and how these theories have been empirically verified in the four different strands of literature in LBO research. These strands of literature are categorized by phase in the LBO transaction: Intent (of a buyout), Impact (of the LBO on the various stakeholders), Process (of restructuring after the leveraged buyout) and Duration (of retaining the private status). Then, the paper shows that in the first half of the 2000s, a public-to-private LBO wave re-emerged in the US, UK and Continental Europe, whose value vastly exceeded that of the 1980s US LBO wave. Finally, the paper provides suggestions for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2017. "Leveraged Buyouts : A Survey of the Literature," Discussion Paper 2017-015, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:573ebdd5-a720-4110-8ed1-e7932a4d1cb4
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    publit-to-private transactions; going-private deals; private equitiy; management buyout; leveraged buyout; management buy-in; MBO; LBO; reverse LBO;

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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