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Management Buyouts, Supervision And Employee Discretion

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  • Kevin Amess
  • Sarah Brown
  • Steve Thompson

Abstract

Using a matched sample of 1959 firms and 27,263 employees from the UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey, we examine the effects of the management buyout (MBO) organizational form on employee discretion and supervision. Our findings suggest that for MBO firms, supervision is lower where there is a higher proportion of craft and skilled service workers but is not lower for other occupational groups. Using random effects ordered probit analysis, we find that employees' discretion over their work practices is higher in MBO firms; and that the probability of higher discretion is greater where there is a higher proportion of craft and skilled service employees. Our findings are consistent with: (i) MBOs reducing hierarchical tiers and the number of supervisory staff, which increase employees' span of control and their discretion; and (ii) organizational change via an MBO being ‘skill biased’ in favour of craft and skilled service employees.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Amess & Sarah Brown & Steve Thompson, 2007. "Management Buyouts, Supervision And Employee Discretion," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 54(4), pages 447-474, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:54:y:2007:i:4:p:447-474
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00424.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00424.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2006. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 759-773, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Olsson & Joacim Tåg, 2017. "Private Equity, Layoffs, and Job Polarization," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(3), pages 697-754.
    2. Tåg, Joacim, 2010. "The Real Effects of Private Equity Buyouts," Working Paper Series 851, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Andrea Dello Sbarba & Riccardo Giannetti & Alessandro Marelli, 2020. "Private equity firms and management control: the framing of shareholder-oriented practices," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(4), pages 953-987, December.
    4. Kevin Amess & Mike Wright, 2012. "Leveraged buyouts, private equity and jobs," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 419-430, May.
    5. Agrawal, Ashwini & Tambe, Prasanna, 2016. "Private equity and workers’ career paths: the role of technological change," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69476, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2017. "Leveraged Buyouts : A Survey of the Literature," Other publications TiSEM 573ebdd5-a720-4110-8ed1-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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