Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis
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Cited by:
- Dharmapala, Dhammika & Khanna, Vikramaditya, 2016.
"The Costs and Benefits of Mandatory Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reactions to the JOBS Act of 2012,"
Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting,
now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 139-186, April.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, 2014. "The Costs and Benefits of Mandatory Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reactions to the JOBS Act of 2012," CESifo Working Paper Series 4796, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dhammika Dharmapala, 2016. "Estimating the Compliance Costs of Securities Regulation: A Bunching Analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b)," CESifo Working Paper Series 6180, CESifo Group Munich.
- Etienne Farvaque & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Dhafer Saïdane, 2011.
"Corporate disclosure: A review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs,"
International Economics,
CEPII research center, issue 128, pages 5-31.
- Etienne Farvaque & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Dhafer Saïdane, 2016. "Corporate disclosure: a review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs," Working Papers hal-01391688, HAL.
- Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Barbara Petracci & Massimo Spisni, 2015. "“Hit and Run” and “Revolving Doors”: evidence from the Italian stock market," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(2), pages 285-301, May.
- Jiraporn, Pornsit & Jumreornvong, Seksak & Jiraporn, Napatsorn & Singh, Simran, 2016. "How do independent directors view powerful CEOs? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 268-274.
- Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2017. "Leveraged Buyouts : A Survey of the Literature," Discussion Paper 2017-015, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Anastasia Cozarenco & Ariane Szafarz, 2016. "Microcredit in Industrialized Countries: Unexpected Consequences of Regulatory Loan Ceilings," Working Papers CEB 16-021, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
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